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FOREWORD
This report documents The Aerospace Corporation effort on
Study 2. 4, Standardization and Program Effect Analysis, which was per-
formed under NASA Contract NASD 2727 during FY 75. The study direction
at NASA Headquarters was under Mr. N. Rafel, Director of Program
Practices of the Low Cost Systems Office.
This is one of four volumes of the final report for Study 2.4.
The volumes are:
Volume I	 Executive Summary
Volume II	 Equipment Commonality Analysis
Volume III
	
Design-to-Cost Analysis
Volume IV'	 Equipment Compendium
Volume I summarizes the overall study in brief form and
includes the relationship of this study to other NASA efforts, significant
results, study limitations, suggested research, and recommended
additional effort.
Volume II documents the analyses performed in selecting
the flight-proven hardware for the NASA new starts.
Volume III provides information on the design-to-cost pro-
cedures used on an Air Force satellite program.
Volume IV catalogs housekeeping subsystem components
from eight NASA and nine DOD current satellite programs. The compen-
dium provides a summary of programmatic, technical, and environmental
data for each component.
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NOMENCLATURE
AEDC Arnold Engineering Development Center
F	 AFSCF Air Force Satellite Control Facilityi
t,	 BC The Boeing Company
CDR Critical Design Review
CER Cost Estimating Relationships
CIDR Configuration Item Design Review
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee
DAC Date of Award of Contract
ELMS Earth Limb Measurements Satellite
FP Fixed Pricr.
GAC Grumman Aerospace Corporation
GD/C General Dynamics/Convair
HRC Honeywell Radiation Center
ORD Orbital Requirements Document
RFP Request for Proposal
RRI Riverside Research Institute
_.	 S AMTEC Space and Missile Test Center,
Vandenberg AFB
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STG Space Test Group
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
This task examines the program procedures that were incor-
porated into an on-going "design-to-cost" spacecraft program. Program
procedures are the activities that support the development and operations
of the flight unit: contract management, documents, integration meetings,
engineering, and testing. This report is limited to the program procedures
that were implemented, with emphasis on areas that may depart from normal
satellite development practices.
The only satellite program as of this date that has used the
design-to-cost philosophy was the spacecraft portion of the Earth Limb
Measurements Satellite .(ELMSI pro gram. The other portions of the ELMS
program not using the design-to-cost concept were the payload (sensors),
orbital data reduction, and launch vehicle.
Contractor participation in the ELMS program b.a.in when
the Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued on 5 April 1973. After an
evaluation and negotiation period, the Grumman Aerospace Corporation
(GAC) proposal was accepted and contract go-ahead was on 19 September
1973. The spacecraft program was terminated in November 1974 after
13 months of a 27-month program. The termination was attributed to low
program priority and the shortage of funds, combined with a projected
overrun at completion. Although the program was not continued to com-
pletion, it has provided data on the design -to -cost philosophy. The experi-
ence gained from the 13-month program should be useful for any other
program that may plan to use design-to-cost as a cost control method.
Tne abrupt contract termination has limited the number of
reports to be completed and accessibility to the submitted reports. Reports
that were reviewed are listed in the references, including the document
concerning design-to-cost which is described in the RFP letter of trans-
mittal (Ref. 1). Discussions were held with individuals associated with
the ELMS spacecraft at various levels and capacities, including the pro-
gram office, contracting officer, and cost estimator at SAMSO; program
.a
1
office and technical personnel at The Aerospace Corporation; and the prugram
office at GAC. Since discussions would tend to be subjective, many dis-
cussions were held about similar concerns in an attempt to obtain objective
information. After each discussion, mineI.i',s were written and coordinated
to ensure that the discussions had been correctly recorded.
2
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2.	 DESCRIPTION OF ELMS
The objective of the two-flight ELMS program was to determine
the earth limb infrared radiance as a function of altitude and wavelength
over a variety of sun illumination conditions and geographical locations.
Each ELMS spacecraft was to be an orbiting platform for the sensor and
was to provide electrical power, cooling, telemetry, and command functions
to operate the payload for a minimum of 20 days on orbit. In addition to
sensor cooling, the spacecraft would have provided a deployable optical
shield that was cryogenically cooled to enhance payload performance (Ref, 2).
The launch vehicle was to be a modified Atlas F. The ELMS
was to be placed in ballistic trajectory and circularized at the ballistic
apogee by an on-board solid rocket motor which was to be jettisoned after
completion of its burn. The final orbit was to be 556 s 37 km (300 5 20 n mi)
circular in a 65-deg inclination. The satellite was to be earth-oriented
with the payload sensor looking normal to the orbit plane. The sensor would
scan either vertically or horizontally by controlling the spacecraft roll
attitude. To provide vertical scan, the spacecraft would oscillate ± 0. 22 rad
(t 12.5 deg) per 134 sec, or it could hold at any of the angular positiors.
All payload and spacecraft data were to be stored on tape for playback to
an Air Torce remote tracking station. The real-time data were for 32 kbps
and playback rate was for 1. 024 Mbps.
The spacecraft in the launch and orbital configuration is shown
in Figure 1. To fit within the 1. 65 m (65 in.) nose cone fairing, the solar
array and payload sensor shield were designed to be deployable. The basic
spacecraft is 1.4 no (4. 6 ft) in diameter by 4. 12 m (1.3. 5 ft) long. The
internal arrangement of the payload and spacecraft components can be seen
in the expanded view in Figure 2. Basically, the equipment module con-
tains the housekeeping subsystem and provides space for the payload sensor.
The tank module, located aft of the equipment module, houses the 1270
liter (45 cu ft) tank for the cryogenic helium. This cryogen was to be used
for open loop cooling of the payload sensor. Aft of the tank module is located
the solid rocket motor for the final orbit circularization.
3
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iThe spacecraft weight breakdown is shown in Table 1 for the
subsystems, payload, and expendables. The proposal baseline weight
represents the spacecraft weight at the start of the program and includes
a contingency of 82 kg (180 lb). The last weight status was the October
1974 weight statement (Ref. 3) that had a contingency of 14 kg (30 lb). The
actual weight growth was 264 kg (582 lb) or a 21 percent increase over a
12-month period. ' The average weight increase for 12 satellites that were
selected for comparison from completed programs was about 20 percent.
The ELMS still had 10 months remaining before the first launch, which
would indicate that the growth rate for changes was greater than the average
satellite program.
The major contributors to the weight increase were in the
electrical power, thermial contl • ol, and structural subsystems. In the
electrical power subsystems, the solar array assembly increased in weight
due to the replacement solar panels. The solar panels offered in the RFP
were not available and a substitute was made available. The thermal con-
trol weight increased due to the lack of definition for the payload cryogenic
shield, and the inadequacies of the propr;=ed payload cryogenic controls.
The solar panel and thermal changes influenced the design of the structural
and attitude control subsystems. In addition to the *weight growth, the
mass inertia increased, which then required larger reaction wheels. Other
subsystems also increased in weight as shown in the weight breakdown.
6
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Table 1. ELMS Satellite Weight Breakdown
,^
Proposal Baseline Oct. 1 74 Status Wt.
Item kg lb. kg lb
Structures 184 406 226 499
Thermal Control 237 523 277 610
Propulsion 71 156 98 215
SRM (Dry) (28) (61) (29) (64)
Controls & Separation ( 43) (95) ( 68) (151)
Electrical Power 154 340 235
I
518
Attitude Gantrol 31 68 51 113
TT&C 33 72 50 110
Payload 113 250 102 225
Dry Weight 823 1815 1038 2289
Expendables 500 1103 481 1061
Cryogen (Thermal) (196) (431) (167) (369)
Nitrogen (Control) (16) (36) (23) (51)
Solid Propellant ( 288) (636) (291) (641)
Launch Weight 1324 2918 1520 3350
NOTE: Weight includes contingencies of 82 kg (180 lb) for proposal Baseline
and 14 kg (30 lb') for Oct. 174
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3.	 PROGRAM Nb),NAGEMENT
The ELMS program involved several associate contractors
and government organizations for hardware and services. The overall
organization is shown in Figure 3 (Ref. 4). The hardware procurements
were with GAC for the spacecraft, Honeywell Radiation Center (HRC) for
the payload, General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) for the booster and adapter,
and the Boeing Company (BC) for the nose cone fairing. The service organi-
zations involved were the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) for
the orbital operational control, SAMTEC/STG for the launch site operations,
Riverside Research Institute (RRI) for orbital data reduction, The Aero-
space Corporation for the system ergin Bring, and SAMSO/ELMS for
program integration.
The spacecraft contractor had a. highly centralized project
management arrangement. The GAC/ELMS program director reported
directly to the Vice President for Space. Report;t.g to the GAC program
director were the engineering, assembly and test, and subcontract pro-
curement managers. Contracts, quality assurance, configuration manage-
ment, and program control were staff to the program director. At the
peak activity period, the team size grew to approximately 220 members.
The SAMSO program office ha-d a "mini SPO" arrangement
under the Deputy for Technology to manage the large number of contractors
and service organizations. The GAG contract was the responsibility of
the ELMS spacecraft project officer. A group of system and subsystem:
technical specialists were provided by Aerospace to assist the project
officer. The average number of SAMSO officers and Aerospace MTS
providing direct support were four and eight, respectively. In addition
to the direct SAMSO support, there was an average of six part-time SAMSO
personnel supporting procurement, program control, launch vehicle,
SAMTEC, and STP.
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4.	 CONTRACT DESCRIPTION
The GAC contract for the ELMS spacecraft was a cost plus
fixed fee (CPFF) contract with a provision covering the maximum obli-
gation of the goverment. A copy of this provision is contained in Exhibit 1.
This cost ceiling provision was obtained from WPAFB/ASD and is the type
used in the lightweight fighter aircraft contracts with Northrop and General
Dynamics/Convair Corporations. SAMSO did not attempt to make a legal
assessment of the provision; however, unofficial comments by corporations
have implied that the maximum obligation is not a binding ceiling. The
term "best effort" may not make the cost ceiling a legally binding cost
limit.
The contents of the GAC contract (Ref. 5) had no direct
reference to design-to-cost; however, GAC was required to conduct detailed
analytical requirements studies and design studies to define the design to
meet the requirements of the contract. With the cost ceiling and schedule,
the cost, performance, and risk tradeoff analyses are implied. The indi-
cation that design-to-cost will be employed is in the RFF letter of transmittal.
The phrase used is that the Air Force intends "... to employ a design to
cost philosophy on this procurerent with a cost objective of $14M" (Ref. 1).
The spacecraft procurement emphasized simplified and
streamlined procurement and management approaches, minimum docu-
mentation and re porting, and maximum use of low cost, flight proven
hardware. To meet these goals, the design-to-cost philosophy was
employed.
The major parts of the spacecraft contract were:
a. CPFF with maximum obligation of the government
b. Deliver two spacecraft, with the second article being a
refurbished qualification spacecraft
C.	 Provide open-cycle cooling for the payload sensor
d.	 Extensive ail-up qualification and acceptance testing
of the integrated payload/spacecraft
1J
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E(S) OOYI:flNUN^a FUNNIS;fEU PFOPENI't
Parouans to the clause hereof entitled "Governoent Property (Coat
Reimbursement)", the Government shall fu'rnieh the Contractor for
see in the performance or this contract the property duscribod in
paragraph 1.2 of said Attachment 1, not later than 75 JAN 0e for
Isae OOOIAA and not later than 75 APE 25 for Item O001AB sod
that Goverrm,at Purnis,id Property identified In 'Boat rod Anal
Coot - Attachment - ConoolldoteG Lie: of Gowra nt Furnished
Property, Special Tooling and lest Equipwant, Use of Govern=mt
7aciiities on a ),,a Cnarge Baaia" dated T3 wBI. 26 which is hereby
incorporated. by reference. Military aircraft will be provided to
tranoport spacecrofto Rom Contractor'a pLa.'m to Araelu Ea3lacdr-
1ng Oewlapment Center for teetiag Ana return to ContreatOr'a plant,
and from Contractor', plant to 'Vandanberg AFB, CA.
(12) MAXDM OBLIGATION OF W GOVFR*WT
(a) Notwithstanding any provioload of the uauees entitled
"Limitation or Fwaiu" or "All"able Coat, Fixed Fee, and Payment"
or any other provision or the General Provisions hereof to the
contrary, the ,aixim,m obl lgati IN of the Government for all effort
(direct and Inairrct), materials, supplies, se.- vices., and data
requires to be perfirhea under this contract s1',411 not, at any
time, Including termtrrtidn, exceed : 12 r 5rj6,100 00 The Contractor
will exert his "best efforts" to accuspliuh the sake enumerates In
tble contract witnLn the Government's maximum obligation set forth
herein. It is not anticipated that any amount In exceal of all a,
limitation will be added to this contrast.
(b) Indirect and direct enst_ .nc'„rren by the Contractor and other-
wise allownbl p and aIlocaal( to this cn,mract and whteh exceed the
maximum obligation of the Government under this contract will not
be recognized by the Cowrnment, and the Contractor shall nor.
requent any reimbursement from the Government under this or any
other Government contract or subcontract '^r any ouch coats either
an direct or indirect charged. Any references in the General
Provisions to estimates costs shall be construed in a manner con-
aistent with this purpose.
(c) Notwithstanding the above Limitations, the Contractor agrees
f	 that (1) title to any rquiprent, supplies or materials purchased or
lubricated by the Contractor in the performance of this contract
ahall pass to the Government under the provisions of the "Government
Property (Cost Reimbursement)” clause to the s age extent as though
the Contractor were entitled to be reimbursed all the allowable cost
thereof; and (ii) he shall maintain a complete record purouant w
the	 •	 clause of all coats which are nonco.11y
allowable under the terms >f a cost reimbursement contract. Except
as specificully modified by this provision, all the clauses of
this contract shall apply to the work the coot of which Is borne
by the Contractor.
( 13) REOIRF.CTIGN OF EFFONi
NotwitllntandlnG any other provisions of this contract, the procur-
inC Contracting Officer she,! be the only individual authorited to
redirect the effort or in any way amend any of the terms of this
contract.
	
PART II - ME g/HEDULZ'
• "Examination of Records by
	 CON'PRACr F04701-74-C-0007
	
Comptroller General"	 PAGE 6
Exhibit 1
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e. Spacecraft to accomplish circularization into final
mission orbit
f. Contract period of performance to be 27 months, with
Lhe first launch at the end of the 22nd month and the
second at the end of the 25th month.
From the early beginnings of EI,MS through contract nego-
tiations, there was no official DOD guide on implementing design-to-cost.
There were many studies and papers addressing design-to-cost by DDR&E.
and "captains" of industry to promote the concept (Reis. 6, 7, and S). The
SAMSO procurement office conducted an extensive investigation in March
1973 to determine the procurement actions that are necessary to implement
design-to-cost. The conclusion was to implement the "maximum obligation"
provision discussed above. The official DOD guide was published 3.n October
1973 (ref. 9) and was directed toward controlling unit production costs for
major weapon systems where large productions are involved.
GAG implemented the design-to-cost philosophy by creating
a balance between performance, schedule, risk, and cost (Ref. 10). The
rationale was that the aerospace industry possesses extensive experience
on spacecraft design. The design-to-cost philosophy was implemented
throughout the duration of the GAC contract.
The other hardware and service contractors were not using
f	 the design-to-cost concept. The cost ceiling necessitated GAC to be aware
of the cost performance tradeoff anaLyses. The type of contract for each
contractor is summarized in Table 2.
13
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Table 2. Types of Contracts
Elements Company Types ofContract
Spacecraft Grumman Aerospace Corp. CPFF+
• Spacecraft Max. Obl.
o Field Support (1)
• AGE & Software
Payload Honeywell Radiation Center CPFF
• Payload
• Associated AGE
Launch Vehicle General Dynamics/Convair CPFF
• Atlas F Aerospace Div.
• Agena Adapter
• Launch Services
• Associated AGE
Fairing The Boeing Company FP
• Nose Cone Fairing
a Fairing Adapter
• Associated AGE
Data Reduction Riverside Research Institute
• Post Flt. Data
Reduction
GSE/TD ( 3 ) The Aerospace Corporation Enabling
• System Engineering Clause (2)
• Technical Support
NOTE: (1) Maximum obligation to government.
(2) Contract for services of technical group.
(3) All contracts contained a GSE/TD enabling clause.
14
5.	 SPACECRAFT COST
The ELMS spacecraft RFP disclosed in the letter of trans-
mittal a procurement cost objective of $14M. This value was later cor-
roborated by contractors who submitted proposals ranging from below to
above the $14M cost objective; however, three major contractors declined
to respond to the RFP. The contract was awarded to GAC for a total price
of approximately $13M. This price included a fixed fee of approximately
$1. 4M. The selection criteria were based on technical and cost reasonable-
ness evaluations.
Generally, the satellite program funding level is based on
estimates from pre-RFP contractor studies and the SAMSO cost model.
Both techniques provide inputs for determining and Justifying the program
cost level. The contractor studies that were performed were for a pre-
decessor satellite study, the Background Mapping Satellite (BMS). The
BMS was a one-flight advanced technology program that was planned for a
I long crbital life. It was to employ a closed-loop cryogenic cooling system
and the spacecraft would accommodate a number of payload sensors. The
spacecraft cost estimates ranged from $25M to $30M.
The SAMSO cost model is based on subsystem cost estimating
relationships (CERs) which are determined from a data bank of historical
satellite program costs. These CERs are related to specific satellite
parameters, such as weight, stabilization method, electrical power level,
payload characteristics, etc. For ELMS, the satellite parameters were
not within the data bank, For example, there were no costing precedents
for design-to-cost, short design life (three weeks), extensive use of flight
proven components, or open-loop cryogenic cooling. Since these design
parameters were difficult to quantify,' they were allowed for by estimating
a cost range. A breadboard concept was assumed for the low end and an
operational concept was assumed for the high end. The breadboard concept
cost is roughly one-third a normal spacecraft cost. The resulting cost
range was a series of estimates. The estimator's lower value was used
in the pre-proposal planning.
01
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It should be reczgnized that the SAMSO model will estimate
a higher cost than a contractor, because the SAMSO cost includes an
average number ci contract changes and other factors that will increase
the cost. The contractor estimate does not anticipate changes beyond the
Statement of Work. Under design-to-cost there can be no changes that will
increase the cost. The changes must be justified by cost/performance
tradeoff analyses.
The changes to the GAC proposed baseline configuration during
the 13-month program duration are briefly described in Section 2, Des-
cription of ELMS. At termination, approximately 50 percent of the GAC
work was completed with an approximate expenditure of $11M. The esti-
mated cost to complete would have exceeded the $13M cost obligation.
16
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6.	 PROGRAM SCHEDULE
The master schedule of the spacecraft and payload is shown
in Table 3 (Ref. 5). The GAG internal schedule for the conceptual phase,
validation phase, and qualification testing is included to show the time
allocated for each phase to meet the master schedule. During the first
three months, the cost/performance trades, preliminary design, and docu-
mentation were being performed simultaneously. All of these functions
require coordination between subcontractors, subsystems, and costs. This
phase was completed with the accomplishment of the Configuration Item
Design Review (CIDR).
According to the design-to-cost guidelines (Ref. 9), the con-
ceptual phase is recommended to start after the completion of the Orbital
Requirements Document (ORD). In the ELMS plan, both the ORD and con-
ceptual phase were being performed concurrently. Similarly, concurrent
activities were in progress during the validation phase to meet the master
schedule.
The detail design was being performed during the validation
phase. There is a good likelihood that adjustment.; to th-_ cost goals can
occur during this phase because the production cost begins to firm up. The
ELMS schedule, however, did not have adequate time for alternatives or
design modifications after the approval of the preliminary design at the
CIDR. The CIDR was held three months from the date of Award of contract
(DAC). Mini Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) of the subsystem detail design
were held between four and seven months from DAG. A spacecraft CDR
was initiated nine months from DAC. The systems level CDR was not
completed. During the CDR phase, the fabrication of the qualification
model was initiated in order to meet the start of the system qualification
testing which was scheduled for about one year from DAC. After the
qualification test, the model WoiLld be refurbished for the second flight
article. Any design change at the CDR would have had a major impact on
the program schedule.
.a
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Table 3. Program Milestones
Milestones Months
from
Spacecraft Payload DAC
DAC -19 September 1973 0
(Conceptual - CIDR) 3
Mass & Fit Check Model 4-1/2
(Validation - CDR)' 10
Qual. Model - available 12
(Qual.	 Test - start)* 12-1/2
Flt. Model Fab. - complete 14
1st Flt. Model-	 delivery 16
Qual. Model Refurb. - complde 17-1/2
2nd Flt. Model - delivery 19-1/2
1st Spacecraft - delivery 20
1st Launch 22
2nd Spacecraft - delivery 23
2nd Launch 25
End -20 December 1975 27
"Internal GAG schedule
18
7.	 DOCUMENTATION AND MEETINGS
Along with the delivery of two flightworthy spacecraft and flight
support at Vandenberg (VAFB), data in the form of documents were also
required as summarized in Table 4. This list is representative of the types
and quantity of reports required of the program. Most of these reports were
submitted in draft form for approval by SAMSO. The total sum of reports
can exceed 100 documents if each monthly performance and test report is
counted separately. Over 40 percent of these reports were scheduled for
delivery within three months from DAC.
The cost performance report combined with an updated master
schedule was intended to provide monthly data on the actual expenditure,
estimate to complete, manpower and loading, and problem analysis. It was
the management tool for controlling the cost and maintaining the schedule.
Because it had a short development period, this program needed a closely
spaced management review cycle. The approach provided cost and schedule
control, but the actual program progress was not clearly definable in the
absolute sense. It is difficult to measure technical progress between mile-
stones.
All of the management and technical meetings, and review
held at GAC were chaired by SAMSO. The contractor planned the agenda
and schedule, and wrote and published the minutes. The types and fre-
quency of the meetings and reviews are listed in Table 5. The monthly
management and status meetings provided the cost, performance, schedules,
and individual problem area status. The technical r.;uetings coordinated
the interfaces, examined the technical progress, and reviewed the space-
craft for buy-off. The as-required meetings included -special working group
meetings on interfaces and mini CDRs. The GAG program office was
involved in meetings on 20 percent of the working days.
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Table 4. Deliverable Documentation
(Reference 4)
No, Title
Date
Submitted(me)
1• req. Copies
1, Co62 Performance l Mthly. 4.
Minutes of Formal Reviews, Inspection 3 Days As Req, 5
3. Program Schedule I As Req. 5
4, Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - Elect, Pwr. 4 1 Req. 4
5, Iilgh Risk/L.oug Lead Time Items 1. 5 1 Raq. 4
6, Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - All. Conlrcl 4 1 Req. 4
7, System Segment. Specifications 2 1 Req. 1.0
8. Engineering Change Proposals As Req. As Req. 12
9. Configuration Item Development Spee. 2.5 1 Req. 13
J. Configuration Item Product Fab. Spec. 9 1 Req. 12
11. Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - Thermal Cont. 5 1 Req, 4
12, Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - 'f'1'&C 4 1 Req. 4
13, Configuration Management Plan 1.5 1 Req. 6
14. System Litegration Plan 1. 5 1 Req 13
15, Engineering Data Interface 2 1 Req. 17
16, System/Subsystem Summary 2 i iwq. 1'+
17. System Test Plan 1 1 Req. 14
I8, Category I Tuat Plan/ Procedures 1, 5 As Req. 13
I9. Category II Test Plan/Procedures 1. 5 As Req. 14
20, Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - Structures 1. 5 1 Req. 4
21. Acceptance Test Reports S/C Del. 1 per S/C I
•t.2. 1-11,11 Plan - Spacecraft 1 1 Req. 9
23. EMI Plan - Systems, Subsystem & Co m p • •1 1 Req. 9
24, Test Reports - -Tor each Cat, I & Cal. 11 Tests >T a 6
25. Reliability/ 1,1aintainability Prog. 	 Plan 2 1 Req. 6
26, Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt, - Dynamic Model. 3 1 Req. 6
27. Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - Loads & Stress h	 7 1 Req. 5
28. Suspect Material Deficiency Notice As Req. As Req. 6
29. Ref, Reporting & Feedback Failure Summary As Req. As Req. -
30, System Safety Plan 1 1 Req. 13
31, Aerospace Ground Eqt,	 Plan 1. 1 Req. 14
32. Exercising Capability Plan - Field 6 1 Req. l2
33. Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - Qua). Data 2 1.Req. 10
34. Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - System Safety 2 1 Req. 13
35, Contamination Prevention & Control Plan - As Req. 14
36, Mass Properties Rpt. - Missiles & Space 1 Mthly. -
37, Missile System Ground Safety Plan 18 1 Req. 13
38, Missile Flt. Safety - Range Safety 18 1 Req. 15
39, Flight Plan Approval Package 6 1 Req. 17
40. Orbital Requirements Doc.. 4 As Req. 16
,11, Abstract of New Technology Ar Req. As Req, 4
42, Technical Information and Research Plan As Req. As Req. 3
43. Test Facility Requirements Doc. •.• I 14
44. Subsystem Design Ana. Rpt. - Orbit Cite. 5 1 Req. 5
45. EL. dS Spacecraft Flight Reports Post Flt, - 22
46. Agenda/Design  Reviews Mtg, As Req. As Req. 5
47, Engineering Drwg. for Design Reviow - - -
48, Forecast of Propellant Requireme is Semi Annual 2
t sw )
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Table 5. Meetings and Reviews
No. Meetings Frequency Date
Contractor Sponsored
1. blon';hly T::chr.cal end Interface Mgt. Monthly 1st Wk.
and Status*
2. Technical Interface Working Group As Req. --
3. Configuration Item Design Review 1 3 Mo. DAC
4. Critical Design Review i 9 Mo. DAC
5. Acceptance Reviews - Incremented 2 20 Mo. DAC
and Formal
6. Post-Flight Mission Reviews 2 Post Flt.
USAF Sponsored
7. Launch Test Working Grot @ VAFB 8 TBS
8. Sateliite Control Facility Mtg. @ AFSCF 8 TBS
9. Flight Readiness Meetings @'VAFB 2 Pre-Flt.
10. Post-Flight Quick-Look Mtg. @ VAFB 2 Post Flt.
First Interface review meeting not later than 2 mo. from DAC
and subsequent meetings as required, but no more than one month
between reviews.
21
a
{8.	 ENGINEERING
The basic engineering practice was the same as that used on
any other SAMSO satellite program. The analysis and engineering drawings
received the normal detail procedure of the checking and approval cycle.
The reliability programs such as quality control, qualification testing, sys-
tem testing, and inspection were implemented according to the procedures
for developing a fully qualified spacecraft. There appeared to be no reduction
in reliability requirements or increase in risk. If there was any risk, it was
in '-he vehicle testing program which is discussed in Section 9.
During the conceptual phase, which was the initial three
months of the contract, GAC performed its cost/performance tradeoff analysis
with the potential subcontractors to preliminary-design the spacecraft and
to select the subcontractors. The schedule was tight to complete the pre-
liminary design, select the subcontractor, and supply documentation. The
contractor requested that the Aerospace interface be minimized through
CIDR. This arrange , - ent was approved by SAMSO since it permitted GAC
to conduct cost performance trades to arrive at a design that would meet
the requirements.
At the completion of the conceptual phase, the contractor was
not required to present the spacecraft system test plan to meet the system
requirements and criteria at the CIDR. Following this milestone, the CDR
was performed incrementally and culminated in a `.ormal review six months
after the CIDR. At this meeting the spacecraft configuration item product
fabrication specifications were presented. Concurrent with the documen-
tation, the qualification model was being fabricated.
From the above series of events and concurrent activities, it
is apparent that the cost/performance tradeoffs must be performed prior
to CIDR, i. e. , prior to subcontractor selection and manufacturing.
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Following CIDR, both the prime and subcontractors had definitized the
design.	 he design then was basically frozen, and the remaining effort
was to develop and demonstrate design adequacy.
It was observed that neither the cost nor the schedule would
be benefited by implementing cost/performance changes after the subcon-
tractors were selected and under way. Changes become costly and the
schedule will suffer if the suppliers are redirected. The cost/performance
trades during the initial three months consumed a considerable amount of
GAC manpower, but these trades were cost-effective since subcontract
costs were either maintained or reduced over the proposal estimates. To
reduce the estimated cost to complete, changes to the contract- such as
schedule and delivery quantity would have been required. The spacecraft
performance requirement was not changed or revised, nor were any such
changes proposed. The unforeseen technical problems were predominantly
the unavilability or scarcity of critical parts, which caused late delivery or
affected design, and misunderstanding of spacecraft requirements.
Unavoidable problems were:
a. Solar panels thought available during the RFP period
were no longer in stock. Replacement solar panels
required the solar array to be redesigned, which
affected other subsystems.
b. Connectors, diodes, and resistors were in short
supply and caused delays up to five months.
Technical problems were:
a. Parts shielding for electromagnetic interference
b. A deployable payload cryogenic shield
C.	 Telemetry transmitter development
d.	 Payload cryogenics controls
Most of these changes or shortages impacted the spacecraft
through weight increase, inertia increases, and thermal balance. The
weight increased to such a level that weight savings were required of the
}j
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istructure by special machining. The mass inertia increase, particularly
the solar array change, caused the control subsystem to increase its
control muscle. Various changes discussed above required thermal
analyses to be performed to check the heat balance which, in some instances,
required additional thermal heat pipes. The delay in parts delivery resulted
in premium labor to maintain the schedule or in having to use commercial
parts with replacement at a later date with high reliability parts. This
latter approach would cause labor costs to double.
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iq.	 TESTING
The spacecraft testing concept was to perform extensive all-
up qualification and acceptance testing of the integrated payload/ spacecraft.
The test plan was to fully qualify all of the hardware designs, perform
all necessary engineering and development tests, test the tracking, teleme-
try, and command subsystems against an actual AFSCF/RTS, and perform a
space vehicle qualification test and an acceptance test of each flight system.
The system qualification and system acceptance tests were to be performed
under simulated mission conditions with test hardware fully operable and
were to demonstrate actual spacecraft operations as closely as possible
(Ref. 4).
The above testing specifications and procedures have been
developed over the years to satisfy performance and to provide good
reliability. Based on this background, it would appear that any reduction
in tests would put more importance on the remaining tests. To reduce
costs, this area received much :attention and changes were recommended
by the contractor. These were:
a. Waive 100 percent humidity testing requirements for
component level qualification (accepted by change order)
b. Allow the use of spacecraft as the test bench by isolating
subsystems to perform subsystem checks (accepted by
change order)
C.	 Allow changes in test schedule and sequence during
the bench tests
d.	 Use the GAC testing facilities instead of the Arnold
Engineering Development Center (AEDC) to perform
the system qualification tests (accepted by change order)
The above items were changes in the testing sequence and
did not affect the basic testing philosophy except for the substitution of GAG
for the AEDC facility. The GAG test chamber was smaller and could
not accommodate the deployment tests of the solar array. The eliminated
pRk7CW1NG PAGE BLANK NOT FA-0".0
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tests of the array deployment in the chamber were replaced with tests
performed under ambient pressure conditions. This test modification
eliminated the testing of array deployment under vacuum conditions.
To delete an earlier test series and to accomplish it concur-
rently with system test would appear to be a high schedule and cost risk
approach. Early detection of component design deficiency will result in
a higher likelihood of su:cessful system test and maintenance of the
schedule. Rerun of system test is costly because the cost rate is rela-
tively high.
Flight-proven hardware was used to reduce the number of
component qualification tests; however, considerable man-hours were
expended to qualify the item by similarity. Evidence of sufficient quali-
fication testing was difficult to provide for some items. There were
indications that it might have been more economical to perform the
qualification testing.
System integration documentation for activities at the launch
site is normally prepared by the spacecraft contractor because of his
detailed working knowledge of the spacecraft. Tr reduce program cost,
the integration documentation preparation function was assumed by
SAMSO. This phase of the program covers the launch tower modifi-
cations, contamination control, ground handling equipments, launch
base integration, launch pad testing and opera^Aca, coordination of hard-
ware flow, and maintenance of the detail test schedule.
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10.	 AREAS PRODUCING COST INCREASES
The areas that produced the greatest cost increases were:
a. Inflation: This program had its highest activity during the
nation's highest inflation rate period. Normal inflation of
5 to 7 percent was included; however, the actual inflation
was in the 10 to 15 percent range.
b. Technology: There was no need for technology breakthrough,
but there were significant engineering developments that
were uncommon to satellites. These were the large 1270
liter (45 cu ft) cryogenic helium tank to cool the payload,
the deployable cryo-cooled payload shield, and the space-
craft that oscillates to scan the earth limb.
C. Supplier Deliveries: In addition to high inflation, there was
a period of fuel shortage which caused parts shortages and
long delays. These delays required the use of overtime to
make up scheduled deliveries.
d. Interface: The payload interface data were not com-
pletely defined at the start of the contract. The inter-
face requirements were not defined as scheduled.
e. Documentation: The number and contents of the docu-
ments required were clearly identified in the RFP/SOW.
The costly item in this area was the man-hours required
to work the comments from the review cycle and to update
the documents. This problem can be attributed to the
unacceptable submittals.
f. Meetings: The meetings required more resources than
were planned. Adequate allowance was not made to pre-
pare for meetings and to resolve close-out action items.
g. Engineering: The proposed GAG baseline spacecraft
configuration was changed over the program duration.
These changes were in all subsystems and caused the
weight to approach the booster capabilities before
reaching design completion. The growth rate was
much greater than normal.
h. Schedule: The schedule was tight for a low priority
program. The contract did not provide for flexibility
in the schedule for shortages of critical parts.
i. Management: The management was centralized; however,
the project offices had difficulty in managing the program
because all elements were not under the same type of con-
tract. The contractual approach was being tried for the
first time and the requisite experience, guidelines, and
training in design-to-cost were lacking. There appeared
to be the spirit but not the appropriate contractual and
operating tools to manage the contract.
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11.	 AREAS REDUCING COST
The areas where cost reductions were realized were:
a. Team Concept: The contractor team members were
selected on their multi-discipline, mobile, and "doer"
characteristics. The team members were all located
within one area so that decisions could be made and
coordinated quickly.
b. Procurement Cycle: The subcontractors and suppliers
participated in the cost/performance activity during the
proposal phase and after th° award of the contract. The
selected suppliers for the proposal were required to
resubmit after the prime contract was awarded.
C.	 Cost/Performance: The design-to-cost concept required
economic considerations by the engineers. The cost
ceiling forced the engineers to think in terms of cost,
but it was hard for them to accept the concept in those
areas where a failure could result in mission loss.
1
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CONCLUSIONS
Extensive cost/performance trades are generally performed
during the system analyses. This type of cost/performance analysis normally
ceases to be a significant consideration after the preliminary design. How-
ever, with design-to-cost, cost control will play the major role throughout
the life of the program. The use of design-to-cost to control cost of pro-
grams requiring large resources to develop is difficult to implement,
however, because of the technical problems that may be encountered during
this phase. The magnitude of the resources required during the ELMS
spacecraft development phase was a major portion of the overall program
funding. With the difficulties experienced in ELMS, the development cost
increased substantially and caused program costs to overrun.
To accommodate the rising costs, the design was examined
during the detail design phase to reduce costs. Such contractor review
was conducted after a major portion of the funds was expended. Cost
problems should have been detected earlier, and studies should have been
performed early in the program to determine what modifications could be
incorporated to accommodate the projected cost overrun.
The test procedures were also examined as a potential area
of cost reduction. Since the initial test plan was scoped for delivering a
fully qualified spacecraft, any reduction in development and subsystem
testing would then place more importance on qualification, acceptance,
and functional tests. This area was discussed, and changes in the test
plan were recommended by the contractor to reduce cost by deferring tests.
There was no evidence that a technical assessment was conducted in this
area for making changes to testing procedures that have been established
over the years.
The members of the ELMS program recognized that the pro-
ject was high risk and were willing to accept reduction in spacecraft reli-
ability. This philosophy was not applicable, however, in all aspects of
the spacecraft. There were vital functions in the ELMS spacecraft that
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khad to operate in orbit such as separation, maintain stable and controllable
pointing, and provide telemetry. There are no cost trades for these functions,
since they must be accomplished in flight. Technical guidelines for cost/
performance tradeable items must be established and personnel must be
trained to conduct these analyses early in the program.
In the area of contract management, SAMSO, through years
of satellite development, has found tiie need for visibility into the con-
tractor's performance. The management procedure requires specific
cost and technical documents and frequent technical meetings to monitor
to progress and evaluate the design adequacy. The Air Force goal is to
achieve mission success. This operating procedure must be modified
for design-to-cost, where mission performance is traded against cost.
The program procedures must be adapted to the design-to-cost philosophy.
..1
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